This article discusses the dynamics between informal groups of states
and the UN Security Council. First, I argue that informal groups have
proliferated in response to systemic change. Second, these groups serve as
a mechanism that allows for exit from structural constraints of the
Security Council and voice for stakeholders in a conflict. In effect, they
may narrow the operational and participatory gap growing out of the
multiple incapacities that prevents the Council from formulating an
effective response to crisis situations. Third, the processes of
diplomatic problem solving and its collective legitimation have become
increasingly decoupled. The former tends to be delegated to informal
groups or coalition of states, while the Council provides the latter. I
illustrate how these findings affect one's understanding of power,
legitimacy, and change in the theory of international relations.This article is the extensively revised version
of a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Academic Council on the
United Nations System in 2003. The project received financial support from
the Economic and Social Research Council, United Kingdom (Grant No.
R42200024335), and the Centre for International Studies, University of
Oxford. The UN Studies Program at Yale University was a frequent host and
home over recent years. I would like to express my gratitude for the
long-term support and advice of Karl Kaiser, Bruce Russett, James
Sutterlin, and especially Neil MacFarlane. I also wish to thank Mats
Berdal, Richard Caplan, Sam Daws, Kurt Gaubatz, Marrack Goulding, Jean
Krasno, Edward Luck, David Malone, Lisa Martin, James Mayall, Joseph Nye,
Adam Roberts, Avi Shlaim, Ngaire Woods, and two anonymous referees for
comments and criticism.